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Complex sentences involving adverbial clauses appear in children’s speech at about three 
years of age yet children have difficulty comprehending these sentences well into the school 
years. To date, the reasons for these difficulties are unclear, largely because previous 
studies have tended to focus on only sub-types of adverbial clauses, or have tested only 
limited theoretical models. In this paper, we provide the most comprehensive experimental 
study to date. We tested four-year-olds, five-year-olds and adults on four different adverbial 
clauses (before, after, because, if) to evaluate four different theoretical models (semantic, 
syntactic, frequency-based and capacity-constrained). 71 children and 10 adults (as 
controls) completed a forced-choice, picture-selection comprehension test, providing 
accuracy and response time data. Children also completed a battery of tests to assess their 
linguistic and general cognitive abilities. We found that children’s comprehension was 
strongly influenced by semantic factors – the iconicity of the event-to-language mappings – 
and that their response times were influenced by the type of relation expressed by the 
connective (temporal vs. causal). Neither input frequency (frequency-based account), nor 
clause order (syntax account) or working memory (capacity-constrained account) provided a 
good fit to the data. Our findings thus contribute to the development of more sophisticated 
models of sentence processing. We conclude that such models must also take into account 
how children’s emerging linguistic understanding interacts with developments in other 
cognitive domains such as their ability to construct mental models and reason flexibly about 
them. 
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In order to construct a coherent mental representation of the events described in complex 
sentences, listeners must be able to interpret connectives to establish the semantic 
relationship (e.g., temporality – after, when etc., causality – because, since, concession – 
although, even if etc.) between the main- and the subordinate clause. An additional 
challenge for listeners is that in English (and other languages, but not in all) the two clauses 
can occur in two orders. Compare “She had a cup of coffee before she submitted the paper” 
and “Before she submitted the paper, she had a cup of coffee”. In the first sentence, the 
clause order reflects the order of events in the real world – it is ‘iconic’. In the second 
sentence, the clause order is reversed.  
Although complex sentences involving adverbial clauses appear in children’s speech at 
about three years of age (Diessel, 2004), experimental studies found that children have 
difficulty comprehending these sentences even at the age of six, nine, or even twelve years 
(e.g., Emerson & Gekoski, 1980; Johnson & Chapman, 1980; Pyykönen, Niemi, & Järvikivi, 
2003). They misinterpret the temporal order, or reverse cause and effect in causal 
sentences. Researchers have suggested different explanations to account for these – often 
conflicting – findings. But because individual studies have typically looked at only one type of 
adverbial clause, and used varying methodologies, it is difficult to determine possible 
differences and commonalities in the precise influences of different factors on children’s 
performance across sentence types. The present study investigates the comprehension of 
four different sentence types (after, before, because, if), to test the predictions of four 
different theoretical accounts. 
We first provide a brief characterisation of the four sentence types under investigation, 
together with a short discussion of causality, which is central for the understanding of 
because- and if-clauses. We then present four different theoretical accounts of complex 
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sentence processing in children that we have identified in the literature: 1) the semantic 
account, which assumes that iconicity is the main factor; 2) the syntactic account, which 
assumes that main-subordinate clause orders are easier to process; 3) the frequency-based 
account, which assumes that forms that are more frequent in the input should be easier to 
process; 4) the capacity-constrained account, which assumes that individual working 
memory capacities determine sentence-processing performance. We discuss the details of 
these four accounts and review the empirical evidence for each of them by summarising 
previous findings on children’s comprehension of sentences containing the connectives 
after, before, because, and if, as well as the few studies done with adult participants.  
1.1. COMPLEX SENTENCES 
Complex sentences consist of a main and a subordinate clause. While there are other types 
of complex sentences (e.g., relative clauses, complement clauses), in the context of this 
article we mean sentences with adverbial clauses.. The adverbial clause is introduced with a 
connective (subordinating conjunction) that specifies the semantic relationship between the 
two clauses. In sentences with before and after, this relationship is purely temporal 
(indicating priority and posteriority, respectively). Sentences with because and if, however, 
can express a range of different meanings. As the present study focusses on one particular 
type of causality expressed by because- and if-sentences, we give a short overview of the 
different types of causality. 
According to Sweetser (1990), causality can occur on three different cognitive levels. 
Compare the utterances in (1-3) below: 
1) The cup broke because it fell off the table. 
2) She must be a queen, because she is wearing a crown. 
3) Can you tell me what time it is, because I have this meeting at one. 
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In (1), there is a clear causal relation between the two events, and the two events take place 
in the world independent of the speaker. This type of causality has been called physical or 
content-level causality. In (2), in contrast, the speaker is using the because-clause as 
evidence for her (subjective) belief. This type of causality is said to take place on the 
epistemic level (epistemic causality). Finally, in (3), the because-clause functions as a 
reason for the speaker’s request – it takes place on the level of the speech act (speech act 
causality). Other scholars have suggested dichotomous distinctions such as objective 
(content) vs. subjective (epistemic and speech-act) causality (Lois Bloom & Capatides, 
1987).  
Like because-sentences, if-sentences can be used to express content-relations, epistemic 
relations, and speech act relations between clauses. In the content domain, if-sentences 
typically express causal relations via predictions (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2000: 121), as in “If 
you take this, you’ll feel better”.  
Our study investigates children’s comprehension of sentences expressing content-level or 
physical causality. Note that in this case, there is also a clear temporal element in the 
semantic relationship between the two events: The cause precedes the effect. However, it is 
worth pointing out that in conversation, describing causally linked events is not the primary 
function of because- and if-sentences. In spoken discourse, because-clauses typically 
provide a reason for a statement made (speech-act causality), rather than a cause for an 
effect (Diessel & Hetterle, 2011). And if-clauses often provide a conceptual framework for the 
interpretation of the following discourse, not just the main clause within the complex 
sentence (e.g., Ford & Thompson, 1986). For example, a speaker may say: “If the weather is 
good tomorrow, we could go for a hike”, before providing more details for that proposal. We 
will return to this distinction between the semantics of because- and if-clauses and their 
communicative function at various points in this article. 
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As noted above, in English, complex sentences can occur in two clause orders: main-
subordinate and subordinate-main. (Note that this is true only for adverbial sentences, not 
for other types of complex sentences.) For each sentence type (after, before, because, if) 
one clause order reflects the order of events in the real world, while the other reverses it. 
Table 1 illustrates the interaction of connective and clause order yielding (non-) iconicity. For 
after-, because-, and if-sentences, subordinate-main clause orders are iconic. For before-
sentences, however, main– subordinate clause orders are iconic.  
Connective Clause order  Iconicity 
after subordinate-main After he pats the dog, he jumps the gate. iconic 
main-subordinate He jumps the gate after he pats the dog. non-iconic 
before subordinate-main Before he jumps the gate, he pats the dog. non-iconic 
main-subordinate He pats the dog before he jumps the gate. iconic 
because subordinate-main Because she puts a hat on, she feels warm. iconic 
main-subordinate She feels warm because she puts a hat on. non-iconic 
if subordinate-main If she puts a hat on, she feels warm. iconic 
main-subordinate She feels warm if she puts a hat on. non-iconic 
Table 1: Interaction of connective type and clause order yielding iconicity. 
Iconicity is the central aspect in the semantic account of children’s comprehension of 
complex sentences, which is the first of four different accounts, to which we turn now. 
1.2. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS 
1.2.1. Semantic account 
Clark (1971) conducted the first experimental study on the acquisition of the temporal 
connectives before and after, looking at both production and comprehension in three- to five-
year-olds. In the comprehension task, children were asked to act out sentences like “He 
patted the dog after he jumped the gate” with toys. Not surprisingly, younger children made 
more errors than older children. In addition, children of all age groups made more errors with 
those sentences that were non-iconic, and more errors with sentences containing after 
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with sentences containing before. These findings led her to suggest that children’s 
comprehension of complex sentences is driven primarily by a semantic principle. Children 
initially employ an “order-of-mention” strategy: They assume that what they hear first, 
happens first. In other words, a sentence is being interpreted by assuming a direct mapping 
(analogy) between the sequence of events in the linguistic form (clause order) and the 
sequence of events in the real world. As a consequence, children interpret iconic sentences 
correctly, but misinterpret non-iconic sentences. A correct understanding of both orders 
emerged in her sample at around age five. It should be pointed out that Clark based her 
account on an experiment that included only temporal clauses, and did not specify to what 
extent it should also apply to other complex sentence types. However, it seems reasonable 
to assume that if children operate with an order-of-mention strategy on the incoming speech 
stream, they would do so also with causal and conditional sentences, where these describe 
a causal relationship between two events. 
Clark furthermore suggested that before and after differ in terms of their semantic features. 
The underlying assumption is that words are made up of a number of semantic features, 
which can have positive or negative values, such as [±Prior]. In this framework, it is assumed 
that after is more complex than before (see E. V. Clark, 1971, for details), which results in an 
asymmetric acquisition of the two sentence types. Children would start out with wrongly 
interpreting after as before. 
Subsequent studies that went on to test Clark’s hypotheses used a variety of different 
methods and investigated different age groups (see Table 2), and produced contradictory 
results. Regarding the comprehension of iconic vs. non-iconic sentences, several studies, 
including recent ones, have observed better performance with iconic sentences (Blything & 
Cain, 2016; Blything, Davies, & Cain, 2015; Feagans, 1980; French & Brown, 1977; 
Stevenson & Pollitt, 1987; Trosborg, 1982, for Danish), although the strength of the evidence 
is limited for some studies by the fact that they did not manipulate clause order (i.e., order of 
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main- and subordinate clause) (Feagans, 1980), or confounded clause order with plausibility 
(French & Brown, 1977). Other studies, however, failed to find an advantage for iconic 
sentences (Amidon, 1976; Gorrell, Crain, & Fodor, 1989; Keller-Cohen, 1987).  
Table	2:	Overview	of	previous	studies	on	children's	comprehension	of	complex	sentences,	indicating	the	
connectives	studied	(only	those	relevant	for	the	present	study),	ages	covered	(rounded),	and	tasks	used. 
Regarding the difference between the two connectives before and after, previous research 
has, again, produced divergent results. In line with Clark’s original findings, several studies 
Study Connective Ages 
(yrs.) 
Task(s) 
Amidon, 1976 after, before, 
if 




after, before 5-6 Command task (“Before you move 
the plane…”) 
Blything & Cain, 
2016 
after, before 3-7 Forced-choice “what happened 
last?” (animations) 
Blything, 
Davies, & Cain, 
2015 
after, before 3-7 Forced-choice “what happened 
first?” (animations) 
Carni & French, 
1984 
after, before 3,4 Answering questions after listening 
to stories 
Clark, 1971 after, before 3-5 Act-out 
Corrigan, 1975 because 3-7 sentence-completion, truth-value 
judgment 
Emerson, 1979 because 5-8 Forced-choice (picture sequences) 
Emerson, 1980 if 5-8 Acceptability judgment 
Emerson & 
Gekoski, 1980 
because, if 3-12 Imitation, forced-choice (picture 
sequences), recognition, synonymy 
judgment 
Feagans, 1980 after, before 3, 5, 7 Act-out 
French & 
Brown, 1977 
after, before 3-5 Act out 
Gorrell, Crain, & 
Fodor, 1989 
after, before 3-6 Command task 
Johnson, 1975 after, before 4-5 Act-out, command task 
Johnson & 
Chapman, 1980 
because 6, 9, 11 Acceptability judgments, recall 
Keller-Cohen, 
1987 
after, before 3-5 Act-out 
Kuhn & Phelps, 
1976 
because 5-8 Forced choice (picture sequences) 
Stevenson & 
Pollitt, 1987 
after, before 3-4 Act-out 
Trosborg, 1982 after, before 3-7 Act-out, answering questions 
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have found moderate to strong advantages for before (Blything & Cain, 2016; Blything et al., 
2015; Feagans, 1980; Johnson, 1975), including faster response times in a picture-selection 
task to sentences containing before (Blything & Cain, 2016), while others either did not 
observe a significant difference between the two (Amidon, 1976; Amidon & Carey, 1972; 
French & Brown, 1977; Gorrell et al., 1989; Johnson, 1975), or found the opposite, that is, 
after being acquired earlier/being easier than before (Carni & French, 1984). 
For because- and if-sentences, the evidence supporting the semantic account is even less 
clear. This is in part due to methodological issues. On the one hand, many of the studies had 
relatively high task demands such as requiring meta-linguistic judgments (Corrigan, 1975; 
Emerson, 1980; Johnson & Chapman, 1980). On the other hand, many used sentences that 
were constrained by world-knowledge and plausibility (e.g., Kuhn & Phelps, 1976). In order 
to gauge children’s purely linguistic understanding of the meaning of a connective, it is 
necessary to remove any cues that could guide their interpretation other than the sentence 
itself. Emerson (1979) addressed this by using so-called reversible sentences, that is, 
sentences whose reversed meaning is also plausible. She presented children between 5;8 
and 10;11 with two different three-frame picture sequences, one corresponding to the order 
of events in the test sentence, and one showing the opposite order. The children’s task was 
to select which of the two sequences went with the test sentence. Emerson found that 
children performed better with iconic sentences in which the cause preceded the effect (e.g., 
“Because he could hear the loud noises and the laughing he went outside”). Only the eight-
year-olds were able to make correct selections with non-iconic sentences (e.g., “He went 
outside because he could hear the loud noises and the laughing”). Emerson and Gekoski 
(1980) used the same methodology to test the comprehension of because- and if-sentences 
in children between 2;8 and 11;11 years, complemented by additional tasks such as asking 
children to judge the equivalence of meaning in sentences with different connectives 
(because/so, if/then) or clause orders. Again, above-chance performance was found only at 
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around eight years, but unlike Emerson’s (1979) study, they did not find any effect of 
iconicity. Amidon (1976) who used a command-task (“If the light comes on, you move the 
car”) similarly found no evidence for an iconicity-preference with if-sentences in five-to-nine-
year-olds, but she found above-chance performance already in the youngest age-group. 
To summarise, there is some, albeit not unequivocal, evidence in support of the semantic 
account in children: Children seem better at comprehending iconic temporal sentences, and 
there is some evidence that before-sentences may be acquired earlier/be easier to process 
than after-sentences. The role of iconicity for because- and if-sentences is, however, less 
clear. 
We are aware of only three studies that explicitly studied adult processing of isolated 
sentences containing after and before, one study that looked at because, and as yet no 
study using if. H. H. Clark and E.V. Clark (1968) gave participants sentences like “After he 
tooted the horn, he swiped the cabbages” to memorise, together with a noun cue (“the boy”). 
Participants were then presented with only the noun cues and asked to recall the 
corresponding sentence. They found that recall was better with iconic sentences. Smith and 
McMahon (1970) replicated these findings. Münte and colleagues (Münte, Schiltz, & Kutas, 
1998) used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to investigate listeners’ processing of 
sentences with before and after. Critically, they only compared two types of sentences with 
each other: iconic after-sentences and non-iconic before-sentences. They observed that the 
before-sentences elicited greater negativity, and that the size of the effect was correlated 
with individual working-memory spans, with individuals with higher spans showing larger 
negative effects. Münte et al. suggested that this reflects the differential involvement of 
working memory during the processing of iconic and non-iconic sentences. However, given 
that clause order and connective type were confounded with iconicity, it is unclear if the 
observed effect can be attributed to iconicity alone. Finally, in a study on reading 
comprehension, Irwin (Irwin, 1980) found that college students’ answers to multiple choice 
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questions after reading were more accurate if the causal statements (“Because…,) were in 
iconic form.  
In sum, previous adult studies provide some support for the semantic account, but it needs 
to be pointed out that most of them were reading studies, and that the one study that did use 
auditory stimuli (Münte et al., 1998) had methodological flaws. 
1.2.2. Syntactic account 
A competing hypothesis is that the comprehension of complex sentences is mainly affected 
by syntactic form. Specifically, Diessel (2005) suggested that not only children, but listeners 
in general, find main-subordinate orders easier to process. For this proposal, he adapted 
Hawkins’ ‘‘performance theory of order and constituency’’ (Hawkins, 1990, 1992, 1994). In a 
nutshell, Hawkins assumes that certain syntactic configurations make it easier for the parser 
to recognise the structure it is currently parsing and to build a hierarchical syntactic 
representation. In the case of complex sentences, initial connectives like “after” as in 4(a), 
signal that the structure is a complex sentence. According to Diessel (2005), this requires 
the parser to keep the subordinate clause in memory until the main clause can be parsed 
and the complex sentence fully constructed. In 4(b), in contrast, the main clause can be fully 
processed first. When the subordinate clause is encountered, it can be parsed and attached 
directly to the representation.  
a)  [[After he pats the dog]subordinate clause[he jumps the gate]main clause] sentence 
b) [[He jumps the gate]main clause[ after he pats the dog]subordinate clause]sentence 
Main-subordinate orders are thus easier to process, because they have a shorter 
“recognition domain”: Fewer words must be parsed in order to recognise the syntactic 
structure of the sentence (see Hawkins, 1992, p. 48 for a formal definition). 
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Diessel (2005, 2008) acknowledged that in production, factors other than syntactic structure 
play a role in determining the clause order, namely discourse-pragmatic forces, and 
semantics (iconicity). From a pure processing perspective, however, listeners should find 
isolated complex sentences easier to process if they occur in main-subordinate order. 
To our knowledge there has been no language acquisition study that found support for this 
hypothesis. Some of the earlier studies cited above, which did not produce corroborative 
evidence for the semantic account, reported that children appear to understand main clauses 
better than subordinate clauses (Amidon, 1976; Amidon & Carey, 1972; Gorrell et al., 1989; 
Johnson, 1975; Stevenson & Pollitt, 1987), but not that main-subordinate orders were 
comprehended better. While these findings do not support Diessel’s hypothesis, they could 
be taken to indicate that syntax, more specifically, syntactic constituency (main vs. 
subordinate) plays a role in children’s sentence comprehension. It is notable, however, that 
all the studies that reported a “main clause effect” used a version of the command-task 
mentioned before (e.g., “Before you move the blue plane, move the red plane”). It was 
observed that the majority of errors in the children’s responses were errors of omission, 
rather than reversal errors, as observed by Clark and others who used the act-out paradigm. 
Specifically, children tended to omit the command given in the subordinate clause. 
Researchers have pointed out that the results may be due to the infelicitous use of a 
sentence like “Before you move the blue plane, move the red plane” in the experimental set-
up. Sentences like these could be “used only when the hearer has established the intent to 
perform the action mentioned in the subordinate clause” (Gorrell et al., 1989: 625). If this 
presupposition condition were not met (i.e., if the action in the subordinate clause is not part 
of the common ground), children would simply ignore this part of the complex sentence. . 
What appears at first sight to be a syntactic effect is thus probably more likely a pragmatic 
one.
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For adults, Clark and Clark’s (1968) study on recall of before- and after-sentences found – in 
addition to iconic orders being recalled better than non-iconic ones – that participants 
performed better with main-subordinate orders. Unlike the iconicity-effect, this facilitative 
effect of clause order was, however, not replicated by Smith and McMahon (1970).  
Overall, the evidence for the syntactic account as put forward by Diessel (2005) is not very 
strong. 
1.2.3. Frequency-based account 
Usage-based approaches to language acquisition posit that children’s acquisition of 
grammatical structures is influenced by the frequency of these structures in the children’s 
language input (for an overview, see De Ruiter & Theakston, 2017). Frequency-effects have 
been observed for a range of syntactic constructions. A frequency-based account would 
predict that the frequency of order combinations in connective clauses in the input affects 
children’s comprehension of adverbial clauses. Specifically, one would expect that children 
find those connectives and order combinations which are more frequent easier to understand 
than those that are less frequent. Both analyses of general language corpora (Diessel, 2001, 
2008) and corpora of child-directed speech (De Ruiter, Theakston, Brandt, & Lieven, 2017) 
have found that  
a) because- and if-sentences are much more frequent than after- and before-sentences, 
and 
b) there are clear clause order preferences for three of the four sentence types:  
• if-sentences occur primarily in subordinate-main order; 
• before- and because-sentences occur primarily in main-subordinate order.  
For after-sentences, the picture is less clear. Some studies found that they occur more often 
in main-subordinate order (Diessel, 2008), others found a preference for subordinate-main 
orders (De Ruiter et al., 2017.; Diessel, 2005).  
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If input-frequency influences processing, children (and possibly adults) should find because- 
and if-sentences easier to process, and should show facilitative effects for the preferred 
clause orders of each sentence type, all else being equal. Note that with respect to clause 
order, the semantic account and the frequency-based account make the same predictions 
for before, and if-clauses, because for these sentences, the iconic clause order is also (and 
probably not accidentally, e.g., Diessel, 2005) the most frequent one. Different predictions 
emerge for because-sentences, however: While the semantic account predicts that 
sentences beginning with because are easier to process (subordinate-main), the frequency-
based account would predict that sentences in which the because-clause follows the main 
clause are easier to process/acquired earlier. 
However, frequency effects can occur on different levels of abstraction. Children and adults 
are also sensitive to discourse-based and semantic features of lexical items that are most 
frequently used in specific constructions. For example, Kidd and colleagues (Brandt, Kidd, 
Lieven, & Tomasello, 2009; Kidd, Brandt, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2007) found that children 
most often hear object relative clauses with inanimate head nouns and pronominal subjects, 
and they also understand these complex sentence types best when the sentences are 
formed according to these constraints. A prototypical feature of complex sentences is that 
they contain transitive verbs (De Ruiter et al., 2017.). One would thus expect that complex 
sentences with transitive verbs pose fewer difficulties for children than sentences with 
intransitive verbs.  
There have – to our knowledge – not been any investigations of the links between input 
frequencies of complex sentence forms with adverbial clauses and children’s comprehension 
of these sentences. However, with the corpus findings regarding the different frequencies of 
connectives and clause orders in mind (see above), we can evaluate the results of previous 
studies. The only study that covered three of the four connectives (after, before, and if) found 
that five-to-nine-year-old children showed overall lower error-rates with if-sentences than 
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with after- and before-sentences (Amidon, 1976), in support of a frequency-based account. 
Moreover, to the extent that children have shown a tendency to perform better with iconic 
sentences (see semantic account above), these sentences also reflect the more frequent 
clause orders for before and if-sentences, (and possibly after-sentences) in spoken English. 
But the evidence for because-sentences, which occur more often in (non-iconic) main-
subordinate orders, is rather sketchy. On the other hand, the approximate ages at which 
children have been reported to perform above-chance in their comprehension of complex 
sentences in the various studies indicate that because- and if-sentences may show a more 
protracted development than after- and before-sentences. This would seem to contrast with 
what would be predicted on the basis of a pure form-frequency-based account. 
1.2.4. Memory capacity-constrained account 
Theories of capacity constraints in memory (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992) assume that short-
term memory1 plays a central role in sentence processing, and, crucially, that there are 
individual differences in the resources that a listener (or reader) has at their disposal. As a 
consequence, individuals with lower memory capacity will find it more difficult to keep more 
information in active storage during parsing.  
Note that the capacity-constrained account is not compatible with the semantic account, 
because children’s use of the iconicity principle (and the semantic features account) is not 
assumed to be linked to memory in any way. The capacity-constrained account is, however, 
in theory compatible with both the syntactic and the frequency-based account. The syntactic 
account makes explicit predictions about the processing difficulty associated with the two 
clause orders. It is possible that difficulties with subordinate-main orders are exacerbated by 
low short-term memory capabilities. The frequency-based account does not say anything 
																																								 																					
1 While Just & Carpenter use the term “working memory”, we prefer to describe the capacity involved 
as “short-term memory”, because the task doesn’t involve manipulation of the stored information. But 
the two terms are often used interchangeably, and researchers have difficulties separating the two 
constructs (see Aben, Stapert, & Blokland, 2012 for a discussion). 
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about the influence of memory, but there is no a-priori reason why frequency-effects could 
not be modulated by working memory. For the syntactic and the frequency-based account, 
then, the capacity-constrained account provides an additional hypothesis, rather than an 
alternative: Children with better working memory should perform better in complex sentence 
comprehension tasks than children with lower working memory capabilities.  
Blything and Cain (2016), who investigated three- to seven-year-old children’s 
comprehension of sentences with before and after, found some support for the capacity-
constrained account. Performance in terms of accuracy and speed (response time) was 
predicted better by children’s scores on a memory task (digit span) than by age or 
vocabulary (Blything & Cain, 2016). To our knowledge there have been no studies that 
examined the link between memory and comprehension of because- and if-sentences. 
Studies that investigated the role of working memory in the processing of other types of 
complex sentences (e.g., passives, relative-clauses) have found that memory significantly 
predicted sentence comprehension over and above the influence of age (Magimairaj & 
Montgomery, 2012; e.g., Montgomery, Magimairaj, & O’Malley, 2008). 
For adults, Münte and colleagues (1998) found that participants with higher working memory 
spans showed a more pronounced difference between before- and after-sentences in terms 
of ERP negativity. They took this to indicate that these participants were probably better 
comprehenders, although the study did not directly measure comprehension.  
Taken together, there is some evidence that individual memory capacities influence complex 
sentence processing in general, but up to this point there is only limited support for this 
hypothesis for adverbial clause processing specifically. 
To sum up: There are four different theoretical accounts for the comprehension of complex 
sentences: the semantic account, the syntactic account, the frequency-based account, and 
the capacity-constrained account. More than four decades of research have produced some 
17		
support for each of the four accounts, but because researchers have typically focussed on 
certain types of sentences, and used a plethora of different methods, it is difficult to decide 
between them. Our study evaluates and compares the predictive adequacy of these different 
accounts. We also consider how they may interact in the Discussion. 
1.3. THE PRESENT STUDY 
Our study tests the predictions made by different theoretical accounts across four different 
sentence types (after, before, because, if) by using the same methodology (forced-choice, 
picture-sequence selection) for all types and testing the same children (within-subjects 
design), as well as including measures of short-term memory. Because it is unclear what the 
role of individual differences in general language ability and executive function may be in 
complex sentence comprehension, and in order to control for potential confounding factors, 
we furthermore collected measures of general language ability and executive function 
(inhibition). We also tested children’s understanding of the temporal priority principle 
(causality). If the children in our sample generally understand (event) causality, then a failure 
to comprehend the causal sentences must be due to a lack of linguistic rather than 
conceptual knowledge. In addition, we tested an adult control group to provide a baseline/.  
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1. PARTICIPANTS 
Seventy-one children and ten adults participated. The children were recruited through 
nurseries and primary schools in the North-West of England. Prior informed consent was 
obtained from caregivers/parents. All children were monolingual, native speakers of English 
without any known history of speech or language problems or developmental delays. Of the 
71 child participants, 37 were between 3;6 to 4;5 years old (M = 47 months, SD = 3.8, 20 
girls), and 34 were between 4;6 and 5;5 years old (M = 60 months, SD = 3.1, 25 girls). We 
will refer to the first group as the four-year-olds, and the second group as the five-year-olds. 
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Eight additional children were tested, but their data had to be excluded because they turned 
out to be bilingual (three participants), too old (two participants), too young (one participant), 
or because they did not understand the task (two participants). One child refused to do the 
second session, while the second session with another child had to be aborted shortly 
before completion due to concentration problems, resulting in loss of two responses. A 
technical failure caused the loss of three responses with another participant. Half of the data 
set of one child was lost due to experimenter error. The adult participants (N = 10, M = 33 
years, seven women) were students or staff members at a university in the North-West of 
England, and native speakers of English. 
2.2. MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
The children were tested in a quiet area in their nurseries and primary schools. In addition to 
the sentence comprehension test, children completed five tasks on general language ability, 
short-term memory, executive control, and understanding of causality (all detailed below), 
spread over two sessions on two days. Each session lasted between 25 and 40 minutes. 
Children completed half of all items of the sentence comprehension task in session one, and 
the other half in session two. The language ability tasks and the executive control tasks were 
administered in session one. The memory test and the causality test were administered in 
session two. In both sessions, children always first completed the sentence comprehension 
task before doing the other tasks. The allocation of trials across sessions and the 
experimental lists are described in Experimental lists below. Adult participants did only the 
sentence comprehension task and completed all items in one session, with a short break 
between the two blocks. 
1.1.1. Sentence Comprehension 
Participants’ comprehension of complex sentences was tested using a forced-choice picture-
sequence selection task on a touch-screen. The task was to select out of two picture 
19		
sequences the one that matched an aurally presented sentence. This allowed us to collect 
both response accuracy and reaction time measures. 
1.1.1.1. Design 
The experiment had four factors: one between-subjects factor (AgeGroup), and three within-
subjects factors (Type, ClauseOrder, VerbType), each with the following levels: 
• AgeGroup: 4 years, 5 years 
• Type: after, before, because, if 
• ClauseOrder: main-subordinate, subordinate-main 
• VerbType: transitive, intransitive 
Table 3 shows examples of stimuli in the different conditions.  
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at the sky. 
Because 
she looks 


















Table 3: Conditions of the experiment, 4 connectives x 2 clause orders (main = main clause, sub = 
subordinate clause) x 2 verb types (transitive, intransitive) 
For the adult group, there were three within-subjects factors (Type, ClauseOrder, VerbType). 
There were three items per condition, 48 items overall. 
1.1.1.2. Audio stimuli 
24 complex sentences were constructed, each containing a main and subordinate clause 
representing two actions performed by a single actor (a boy in half of the sentences, and a 
girl in the other). There were six sentences per connective after, before, because, and if. The 
because- and if-sentences always expressed a physical causal relationship between the two 
events (i.e., not epistemic or speech act relations). The stimuli clearly emphasised the 
causal interpretation of these sentences (there was always only one person in each scene, 
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making the use of speech act-causality implausible). Within these six sentences, half (three) 
contained only intransitive verbs, the other half contained only transitive verbs. The objects 
of the transitive verbs were always inanimate objects. Each sentence occurred in both 
clause orders (main-subordinate and subordinate-main), resulting in 48 sentences overall. 
The subject of the sentence was always expressed as a pronoun (i.e., he or she), and all 
verbs were in present tense. All sentences were between 11 and 13 syllables long. (All 
experimental sentences can be found in Table A 1 in Appendix A.) 
The sentences were spoken by a female native speaker of British English, and recorded in a 
quiet room using a digital voice recorder. The stimuli were processed using the software 
Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2016), version 6.0.13. Each sentence was first cut into two 
clauses, and then spliced together again with a pause of 250ms. The overall intensity of all 
stimuli was set to 60dB. 
1.1.1.3. Visual stimuli 
For each audio stimulus (complex sentence), two picture sequences were created (for an 
example, see Table 4), showing the two actions expressed by the sentence in both orders 
(in left-to-right orientation, which is the convention in English picture books). For the 
sentences containing before and after, the second picture sequence was the reversal of the 
pictures of the first picture sequence. This was not possible for the sentences containing 
because and if, since the semantics of these sentences requires there be some change of 
state involved. For example in the sequence matching the sentence “Because he opens the 
door he sees the snowman”, the actor first opens the front door and then finds a snowman 
outside his house. The other sequence has to offer a plausible scenario for the opposite 
order of events (i.e., first seeing, then opening) in order to be an acceptable distractor. In this 
case, the actor was depicted as looking out of the window and seeing a snowman, and then 
opening the door (to have a better look at the snowman). The stimuli were created using the 
software Anime Pro (version 9.1). 
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1.1.1.4. Presentation 
The stimuli were presented using the software E-Prime (version 1.2) on a laptop with a 14-
inch resistive touch-screen. The sound was presented via loudspeakers. 
1.1.1.5. Procedure 
Children 
The children sat at a table in front of the laptop. In front of the laptop there were two pieces 
of red cardboard in hand shape fixed to the table. The children were asked to keep their 
hands on these markers throughout the experiment when they were not selecting a 
sequence. The children were told that they were going to play a game, in which a lady was 
telling them stories about two characters, Sue and Tom, and about some animals, and that 
they had to select from two picture stories the one that matched the sequence that they had 
heard. The children were instructed to listen carefully and touch the matching sequence after 
they hear a beep. 
Before the start of the actual experiment, there was a warm-up phase to familiarise the 
children with the task and the left-to-right reading of the picture sequences. In the warm-up, 
the second presentation of the sentence (see below for details of the set-up) was not 
automatic, but manually controlled by the experimenter, which allowed the experimenter to 
explain the layout of the screen before playing the sentence again (e.g., “Here we see that 
Tom is doing two things in this story. First he is watering his plants. And then he switches 
the light on”, while pointing to the appropriate picture). The first two warm-up trials were like 
the filler trials (i.e., simple sentences with only two pictures; see below). The other warm-up 
trials were like the experimental trials, except that the sentences were of the structure “First, 
…, then…”. If a child did not choose the correct picture in any of the warm-up trials, feedback 
was given and the trial was repeated up to two times. If the child still made the wrong 
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selection, the experimenter proceeded to the experimental trials, but noted that the child had 
failed to complete the warm-up successfully. 
The structure of the experimental trials is shown in Table 4. Before each trial, there was a 
picture of the character that the next “sequence” was about (i.e., a picture of Sue or Tom). 
The experimenter would say something like “Ah, here’s another story about Sue. Let’s see 
what she’s doing!” to focus the child’s attention on the next trial. When the experimenter was 
sure that the child was paying attention, she started the next trial. The child would first hear 
the instruction “Look and listen carefully! Touch the matching story after the beep!”2, while 
seeing a blank screen. Then the sentence was played, with the screen still blank. Directly 
after the presentation of the sentence, the two picture sequences were displayed on the 
screen. After a pause of 1000 ms, the sentence was repeated, followed immediately by a 
beep. Once the child had selected a sequence, the screen showed a blue circle to indicate 
that the trial had been successfully completed. Response time was measured from the offset 
of the beep. If the child was distracted during a trial, the experimenter repeated the trial.  
 
																																								 																					2	One reviewer remarked that, while it is rather unlikely, using the word “after” in the instructions might 
have positively impacted the children’s performance. The results suggest that this was not the case, 
as the children’s performance on after was worse than with before.	
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Visual presentation Auditory presentation 
  
blank screen 
“Look and listen carefully!  
Touch the matching story after the beep!” 
“After she paints the old fence, she hoovers the house.” 
 
1000 ms pause 




Table 4: Structure of the experimental trials. 
After every three trials there was a filler trial to give children a small break with relatively 
easier items. The structure of the filler trials was the same as that of the experimental trials, 
the difference being that children were presented with a simple sentence (e.g., “Lion is 
drying his hair.”) and only two pictures to select from (e.g., a lion drying his hair and a lion 
buttoning his coat).  
The entire experiment took between 15 and 20 minutes.  
Adults 
The adult participants were tested in a quiet room, using the same set-up as with the 
children. Instead of using the hand-shaped markers adults were simply instructed to keep 
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their hands in front of the laptop unless they were selecting a picture sequence. Participants 
were instructed to listen to the sentence and select the matching sequence after the beep. 
The warm-up was the same as with the child participants, but no elaborate explanations 
were provided. After the participants had successfully completed the warm-up, they went 
through half of the trials, followed by a short break, and then completed the other half of the 
trials. Overall the experiment took about 10-15 minutes. 
1.1.1.6. Experimental lists 
Four different experimental lists were constructed. Each list consisted of two sessions. Each 
sentence (N=24) occurred once in each session (recall that each sentence occurred in two 
clause orders), with half of the sentences in each session being in main-subordinate clause 
order and the other half in subordinate-main clause order. There were three items in each 
condition. List 2 was created by swapping session 1 and session 2 of List 1. Lists 3 and 4 
were the same as Lists 1 and 2, with the difference that all after-sentences were turned into 
before-sentences and vice versa, and all if-sentences were changed into because-sentences 
and vice versa (see Table A 1 in Appendix A).  
The order of the trials within each session was pseudo-randomised. There was a maximum 
of two consecutive trials in the same condition. The position of the correct picture sequence 
in session 1 was counterbalanced, so that in half of the trials the correct picture sequence 
was at the top and in the other half of the trials at the bottom. In addition, the position of the 
correct picture sequence across sessions was counterbalanced, so that for any given scene, 
when the correct picture was at the top in session 1, it was at the bottom in session 2, and 
vice versa. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental lists. 
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1.1.2. Language Ability 
Measures for children’s receptive language ability were collected using two sub-tests of the 
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals®-Preschool-2 (CELF-Preschool-2 Wiig, 
Secord, & Semel, 2004): “Linguistic Concepts” and “Sentence Structure”. The sub-test 
“Linguistic Concepts” requires the child to follow directions of increasing length and 
complexity (e.g., “Point to either of the monkeys and all of the tigers.”). The sub-test 
“Sentence Structure” is a forced-choice picture selection task that tests the child’s 
comprehension of sentences of increasing length and complexity (e.g., “The man who sits 
under the tree is wearing a hat.”). Each sub-test lasted approximately 5 minutes.  
1.1.3. Executive Control 
Children’s executive control was tested using two tasks: the “Day/Night task” (Gerstadt, 
Hong, & Diamond, 1994), and the dimensional change card sort (DCCS) task (Zelazo, 
2006). In the Day/Night task, children are instructed to say “day” when they are shown a 
card with a picture of a moon on it, and to say “night” when shown a card with a picture of a 
sun on it. The task taps into children’s ability to inhibit the intuitive response (e.g., to say 
“night” when they see a picture of a moon). In the DCCS task, children are required to sort a 
series of bivalent test cards, first (pre-switch phase) according to one dimension (colour), 
and then (post-switch phase) according to the other (shape). The task taps into children’s 
flexibility to switch their attention to a different dimension. Both tasks together took about 5 
minutes (16 trials in the Day/Night task, 12 trials in the DCCS task). 
1.1.4. Memory 
Phonological and verbal short-term memory was tested using three tasks, taken from the 
Early Repetition Battery® (Seeff-Gabriel, Chiat, & Roy, 2008): word repetition and non-word 
repetition (which are combined into the “Preschool Repetition Test”, PSRep), and “Sentence 
Imitation Test” (SIT). All three tasks together took between 5-10 minutes. 
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1.1.5. Causality 
Children’s understanding of the temporal priority principle (i.e., the principle that causes must 
precede their effects) was tested using a modified version of the set-up used by Rankin and 
McCormack (2013). Children have to decide which one of two events (A, B) causes an effect 
(E). In the task, children observe one event (A), an effect (E), and then another event (B). 
The events A and B are marbles rolling down runways, and the effect E is the ringing of a 
bell. There were four experimental trials. The task took about 5 minutes. 
2.3. PREDICTIONS AND ANALYSES 
Based on the four accounts outlined in the introduction, we list a number of different 
hypotheses regarding children’s performance accuracy in the sentence comprehension task: 
1. Iconic clause orders are comprehended better/acquired earlier than non-iconic clause 
orders. (semantic account) 
2. Before-sentences are comprehended better/acquired earlier than after-sentences. 
(semantic account) 
3. Main-subordinate orders are comprehended better/acquired earlier than subordinate-
main orders. (syntactic account) 
4. Because- and if-sentences are comprehended better/acquired earlier than after- and 
before-sentences. (frequency-based account) 
5. Frequent, connective-clause order combinations are comprehended better/acquired 
earlier than infrequent ones. (frequency-based account) 
6. Sentences with transitive verbs are comprehended better/acquired earlier than 
sentences with intransitive verbs. (frequency-based account) 
7. Memory should make an independent contribution to performance, in that children 
with higher memory scores perform better than children with lower memory scores. 
(capacity-constrained account) 
28		
The accounts do not make explicit predictions about the speed of processing (response 
times), but it seems reasonable to assume that those structures that are easier to 
comprehend would also be processed faster.  
3. RESULTS 
A total of 3907 responses were recorded. After screening of the data for deviations, the data 
of one child participant was removed, because he had consistently touched the top right-
hand corner of the touchscreen, and also confirmed this when asked about it after the 
experiment. As a result, 48 responses (1% of the data) were excluded.  
3.1. ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
We first present the results for the sentence comprehension task (accuracy and response 
times). We then present the results (raw scores and standardised scores, where applicable) 
for the other tasks, and test if the individual difference scores in those tasks explain 
performance over and above the effects of our experimental manipulations. 
For accuracy and response times (RTs), a series of (generalised) linear mixed effect models 
(GLMMs; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) was fitted to the data using R (R Core Team, 
2016), version 3.3.1. We used glmer for the binomial accuracy dependent variable, and lmer 
for the continuous response times (RT) dependent variable, both from the R package lme4 
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). We used the R packages lmerTest (Kuznetsova, 
Brockhoff, & Bojesen Christensen, 2016) and pbkrtest (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014) for the 
calculation of p-values for lmer models. (G)LMMs allow incorporating both fixed effects 
(experimental manipulations) and random effects (variation specific to individual participants 
and individual items). Following Bates et al.’s (2015) recommendations, we added fixed and 
random effects incrementally to a minimal model, and tested if the inclusion of an additional 
term was justified using the likelihood ratio test for model comparisons (Pinheiro & Bates, 
2000), and pruned non-significant effects, unless they were part of a significant interaction. 
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All final models contained random intercepts for participants and items. In addition, we ran t-
tests to test if performance for the subgroups was above chance. For all other tasks (with the 
exception of the causality task) we ran simple correlations between (centred) test scores and 
mean accuracy and RT, respectively. 
In addition, we performed Bayesian analyses. The reason for this is that conventional 
significance tests are designed to reject the null hypothesis. However, if the null hypothesis 
is true, p-values do not converge to any limit value, and all p-values are all equally likely 
(Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Non-significant results therefore do not 
allow for inference of the truth of the null hypothesis (see e.g., Dienes, 2014). Bayesian 
analyses, in contrast, provide information about the strength of statistical evidence in favour 
of either the alternative hypothesis or the null hypothesis. Bayes factors provide the relative 
probability of the data under the two hypotheses. For example, a Bayes factor of 2 means 
that the data are two times more likely under the alternative hypothesis (HA) than they are 
under the null hypothesis. Similarly, two statistical models can be compared directly with 
each other, and the strength of the evidence for one model (that includes a given main effect 
or interaction) over the other (that does not contain this effect or interaction) can be 
determined. An overview of a common textual interpretation of Bayes factor values is 
presented in Table 5. 
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Bayes factor Interpretation 
> 100 Decisive evidence for HA 
30 – 100 Very strong evidence for HA 
10 – 30 Strong evidence for HA 
3 – 10 Substantial evidence for HA 
1 – 3 Anecdotal evidence for HA 
1 No evidence 
1/3 – 1 Anecdotal evidence for H0 
1/10 – 1/3 Substantial evidence for H0 
1/30 – 1/10 Strong evidence for H0 
1/100 – 1/30 Very strong evidence for H0 
< 1/100 Decisive evidence for H0 
Table 5: Evidence categories for Bayes factor, adapted from Jeffreys (1961), cited in Wetzels et al. 
(2011). HA = alternative hypothesis, H0 = null hypothesis. 
We used Bayesian linear regression from the BayesFactor package (Morey, Rouder, & 
Jamil, 2015). This type of analysis allows comparing a number of different models and 
determining the model that is most likely given the data (that is, the model with the highest 
Bayes factor), and the incorporation of random factors (participant, item). In line with 
recommendations by Morey and Rouder (2011) we used a Cauchy prior with scale 
parameter 1/√2 for the standardized effect size. Cauchy priors are relatively wide and 
symmetric around zero, which means that the data quickly overwhelms the prior (Morey & 
Wagenmakers, 2014: 123). In addition, we used Bayesian t-tests (from the BayesFactor 
package) and Bayesian correlations from the BayesMed package (Nuijten, Wetzels, Matzke, 
Dolan, & Wagenmakers, 2014) to complement the traditional analysis outlined above. 
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3.2. SENTENCE COMPREHENSION TASK 
3.2.1. ACCURACY 
Summary data, together with the adult comparison data, are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Four-year-olds', five-year-olds' and adults' mean proportion of correct responses for after-, 
before, because- and if-clauses in subordinate-main and main-subordinate clause order. The dashed red 
line indicates chance level. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
The mean accuracy in the four-year-old group was 58.3%. The five-year-olds’ mean 
accuracy was higher, at 63.2%. Adults responded correctly in 97.7% of all trials. The 





































there were no significant main effects of AgeGroup, Type, or ClauseOrder, but there were 
significant interactions of AgeGroup and Type, AgeGroup and ClauseOrder, as well as a 
three-way interaction of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. VerbType was not a significant 
factor.  
Fixed effects Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.07 0.16 0.43 .67 
AgeGroup5 -0.17 0.22 -0.79 .43 
Typebefore -0.07 0.19 -0.39 .70 
Typebecause 0.22 0.21 1.03 .31 
Typeif 0.13 0.21 0.61 .54 
ClauseOrdersub-main 0.03 0.19 0.15 .88 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore 1.38 0.29 4.71 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause 0.16 0.28 0.57 .57 
AgeGroup5:Typeif -0.09 0.28 -0.33 .74 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.85 0.29 2.97 < .01 
AgeGroup4:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.21 0.27 0.76 .45 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-
main -1.35 0.31 -4.39 < .0001 
AgeGroup4:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.01 0.28 -0.04 .97 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.10 0.30 -0.32 .75 
AgeGroup4:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.12 0.28 -0.42 .67 
AgeGroup5:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.09 0.30 0.29 .77 
Table 6: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the log odds for accuracy responses: 
effects and Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 
4years, for Type: after, and for ClauseOrder: main-subordinate. Significant effects are highlighted in bold 
font. Note that because Type has four levels, this table shows the results only for the model with “after” 
as the reference level. The summaries of the models with the other three connectives as reference level 
showing the same effects can be found in Appendix B. 
The significant interactions can be interpreted as follows. The five-year-olds performed 
significantly better than the four-year-olds with before-sentences (71.3% vs. 61.7%), and 
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also with sentences in subordinate-main orders overall (69.4% vs. 61.6%). However, for 
before-sentences, the five-year-olds’ performance with sentences in subordinate-main order 
was significantly worse than in main-subordinate order (66.7% vs. 76%). This means that the 
five-year-olds were generally better with sentences in iconic clause order (subordinate-main 
for after, because, if, and main-subordinate for before). Adults performed at ceiling. (Note, 
however, that there were a few errors with if- and because-sentences, which were due to 
one particular item. We return to this in the discussion.) 
The results of the GLMM were corroborated by the Bayesian analysis. The model that was 
most likely, given the data, included the same main effects and interactions (Bayes factor: > 
60million – “decisive evidence” –, compared to only the intercept). In fact, the model that 
included the three-way-interaction was 72 times more likely (“very strong evidence”) than the 
model that did not include this three-way-interaction.  
While the five-year-olds’ performance with before-sentences in general and with all other 
types in subordinate-main order was clearly above chance, it is possible that the four-year-
olds overall, and the five-year-olds in the main-subordinate conditions of the other 
connectives (after, because, if) were at chance level – which would explain the absence of a 
main effect of AgeGroup. We tested each age group’s performance in the eight conditions 
using one-tailed t-tests and Bayesian t-tests. As statistical significance in null hypothesis 
testing depends on the number of intended analyses, it is necessary to correct for multiple 
comparisons. Using Bonferroni-correction, adjusting for 18 comparisons (one for each 
condition, plus two overall) yielded a significance level of 0.05/18 = 0.0028. A correction for 
multiple comparisons is not necessary for Bayesian t-tests (Dienes, 2011). The results are 
presented in Table 7 (four-year-olds) and Table 8 (five-year-olds). 
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 t-test (p) Bayesian t-tests (BF) 
 main-sub sub-main main-sub sub-main 
after .343 .271 0.18◊ 0.2◊ 
before .554 .060 0.16◊ 0.6 
because .025 .018 1.24 1.64 
if .099 .250 0.4 0.21◊ 
overall < .001* 9.31◊ 
Table 7: P-values and Bayes factors for (one-tailed) t-tests testing if performance is above chance in the 
four-year-old age group. Asterisks indicate statistical significance after Bonferroni correction, diamonds 
indicate at least substantial evidence (for the H0, if below 1/3, for the HA if above 3). 
 t-test (p) Bayesian t-tests (BF) 
 main-sub sub-main main-sub sub-main 
after .78 < .0001* 0.21◊ 49484◊ 
before < .0001* < .0001* 254384130705◊ 12382◊ 
because .04 < .0001* 0.86 497025782◊ 
if .69 < .0001* 0.18◊ 2318159◊ 
overall < .0001* 6.54 
Table 8: P-values and Bayes factors for (one-tailed) t-tests testing if performance is above chance in the 
five-year-old age group. Asterisks indicate statistical significance after Bonferroni correction, diamonds 
indicate at least substantial evidence (for the H0, if below 1/3, for the HA if above 3). 
The t-tests show that the four-year-olds’ performance overall was above chance, but this 
emerges only when all conditions are combined – none of the individual sentence types were 
above chance after controlling for multiple comparisons. While the p-values are not 
statistically significant after correcting for multiple comparisons, the Bayes factors provide 
more information: They show that there is “anecdotal evidence” for above-chance 
performance with because-sentences in the four-year-olds, which is likely to be the reason 
for their above-chance performance overall. In addition, the Bayes factors show that there is 
“substantial evidence” for an at-chance performance of the four-year-olds in all after-
sentences, in before-sentences in main-sub order, and in if-sentences in sub-main order, 
and “anecdotal evidence” for at-chance performance in before-sentences in sub-main order, 
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and if-sentences in main-sub order. In addition, there is evidence that the five-year-olds’ 
performance in main-sub ordered sentences was at chance for after-, because- and if-
sentences. 
In summary, four-year-olds showed only a very fragile understanding of complex sentences 
on this task. Five-year-olds showed a better understanding of sentences that were in iconic 
clause order, and for before-sentences overall. 
3.2.2. RESPONSE TIMES 
For the analyses of RTs, only correct responses were analysed (N=2441). After inspection of 
the data, we removed outliers using the following criteria: For children, we excluded all 
responses that were shorter than 300ms and longer than 20000ms (99 responses, 5.9% of 
the data), as it is unlikely that shorter or longer RTs reflect processing of the target stimuli. 
For adults, we excluded all responses that were shorter than 150ms and longer than 
6000ms (17 responses, 3.6% of the data). Overall, 68% of the data from the full data set 
were included (50% of the 4-year-olds’ data, 59% of the 5-year-olds’ data, and 94% of the 
adult data). 
The RT data of all age groups are visualised Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Response times (in milliseconds) of the four-year-olds, the-five-year-olds and the adults for the 
four different sentence types after, before, because, and if. Individual dots represent individual 
responses (raw data). Bars indicate means, beans (the oval shapes around the dots) indicate smoothed 
density, and bands (dark-coloured lines at the top of the bars) indicate the 95% Bayesian Highest 
Density Interval (HDI). The pirate plot was produced using the R package “yarrr” (Phillips, 2016). 
The four-year-olds’ mean response time was 5177ms, the five-year-olds’ was 3278ms, and 
the adults’ 1038ms. 
The summary of the final model for the child groups is shown in Table 9. In addition to 
random intercepts for participants and items the model also contained by-participant slopes 
for Type. ClauseOrder, and VerbType were not significant factors, but AgeGroup and Type 
were. There were no significant interactions. 
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 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 4578.29 336.84 105.48 13.471 < .0001 
AgeGroup5 -1750.53 417.22 99.88 -4.095 < .0001 
Typebefore 89.33 219.39 74.01 0.405 .69 
Typebecause 1047.36 327.32 45.44 3.193 < .01 
Typeif 1227.54 365.56 61.14 3.353 < .01 
Table 9: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times for the child groups: effects of 
AgeGroup and Type. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 4years, for Type: after. Significant effects 
are highlighted in bold font. Note that because Type has four levels, this table shows the results only for 
the model with “after” as the reference level. The summaries of the models with the other three 
connectives as reference level showing the same effects can be found in Appendix C. 
The model was corroborated by the Bayesian analysis: The model under which the data are 
most likely was the one that contained only AgeGroup and Type as factors (Bayes factor for 
this model: 5.7, “substantial evidence”). This model was about 19 times more likely than a 
model that also included ClauseOrder. This provides strong evidence that clause order was 
not a factor that affected children’s response times. 
Looking at the effects in the model in Table 9, it can be seen that the five-year-olds 
responded significantly faster than the four-year-olds. Furthermore, responses to because- 
and if-sentences were significantly slower than responses to after- and before-sentences. 
The summary for the model for the adult control group is presented in Table 10. The only 
significant factor was Type. Adults responded to before-sentences significantly faster than to 
any other sentence-type. However, the Bayesian analysis indicated that the data is about 
four times more likely under a model with only Participant and Item as random factors than 
under a model that also contains Type as factor.  
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 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 1083.93 191.2 11.5 5.669 < .001 
Typebefore -206.43 103.46 448.1 -1.995 < .05 
Typebecause 0.99 106.65 54.3 0.009 .99 
Typeif 65.43 108.56 55.1 0.603 .55 
Table 10: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times for the adult group: effect of Type. 
The reference level is “after”. Significant effects are highlighted in bold font. Note that because Type has 
four levels, this table shows the results only for the model with “after” as the reference level. The 
summaries of the models with the other three connectives as reference level showing the same effects 
can be found in Appendix C. 
In summary, while neither VerbType nor ClauseOrder had an effect on participants’ reaction 
times, Type had: Children had significantly slower responses with because- and if-
sentences. For adults, it may be the case that before-sentences are responded to more 
quickly, but the results of the two analyses (traditional and Bayesian) are ambiguous.  
3.3. INTERIM DISCUSSION 
In the introduction, we presented four different theoretical accounts that have been put 
forward to explain and predict the processing of complex sentences. The semantic account 
predicts that children will perform better with iconic sentences, and that before-sentences will 
be acquired earlier. The syntactic account predicts that sentences in main-subordinate 
orders are easier to process. The frequency-based account predicts that because- and if-
clauses should be acquired earlier/more easily processed, and that for a given connective, 
performance should be better with the more frequently occurring clause order. In addition, 
sentences with transitive verbs should be easier than sentences with intransitive verbs. 
Finally, the capacity-constrained account predicts that individuals with better short-term 
memory skills should perform better generally.  
In terms of accuracy, the results showed that while the four-year-olds performed above 
chance overall, they had only a fragile understanding of the complex sentences. The five-
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year-olds, in contrast, showed a much better understanding of sentences in iconic clause-
order, and of before-sentences overall. These findings thus support hypotheses 1 and 2 from 
the semantic account, (see section 2.3 above), but not hypotheses 3, 4, 5, and 6 from the 
syntactic and the frequency-based account, respectively. 
In the next section, we now turn to the possible role of memory to test the prediction made 
by the capacity-constrained account (hypothesis 7). In addition, we investigate if individual 
variation in general language ability and/or executive function is related to complex sentence 
comprehension, and, if so, if it can explain any additional variance in the children’s 
performance. 
3.4. OTHER TASKS 
We first present descriptive statistics for all other tests that were administered. We then test 
if any of the scores in the memory, language, and executive function tasks are significantly 
(and with at least substantial evidence) correlated with mean accuracy and/or mean RTs. 
Those scores that are significantly, and with substantial evidence, correlated with these 
overall measures are then entered into the optimal statistical models obtained in the 
analyses above (see section 3.2). 
3.4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.4.1.1. STANDARDISED LANGUAGE AND MEMORY TASKS 
The means and standard deviations of the standardised scores for the CELF and ERB sub-
tasks for both age groups are presented in Table 11.  
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AgeGroup 4 5 
Task Mean SD Mean SD 
CELF Linguistic Concepts 10.3 2.2 10.1 2.3 
CELF Sentence Structure 10.9 2.9 9.6 3.1 
ERB Preschool Repetition Test  101.8 13.4 104.4 14.2 
ERB Sentence Imitation Test 95.8 11.6 97.1 11.2 
Table 11: Means and standard deviations (SD) of the standardised scores for the CELF and ERB sub-
tasks for four-year-olds and five-year-olds. 
The means and standard deviations indicate that each group was performing at an age-
appropriate level in all of the tasks.  
3.4.1.2. EXECUTIVE FUNCTION TASKS 
On the Day/Night task, out of a maximum of 12 correct trials, the mean in the four-year-old 
group was 11.3 correct responses (SD = 4.3), and 12 (SD = 4.1) in the five-year-old group. 
In the post-switch phase of the DCCS task, where a maximum of six correct trials are 
possible, four-year-olds achieved on average 3.6 correct (SD = 2.7), and five-year-olds 4.4 
(SD = 2.4). It should be noted, however, that the means are not necessarily informative, 
because the distribution tends to be bi-modal – children get all trials either wrong or right – 
which was also the case here. While the four-year-olds were approximately split between 0 
and 6 correct responses, the majority of the five-year-olds got all trials correct (see Figure D 
1 in Appendix D). 
3.4.1.3. CAUSALITY TASK 
In both age groups, the mode for correct trials was four (the maximum number of correct 
trials) indicating that the children showed an understanding of the temporal priority principle.  
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3.4.2. CORRELATIONS WITH MEAN ACCURACY AND MEAN RT 
We tested correlations between the z-scores of the language, memory, and executive 
function tasks and mean accuracy and mean RT scores using standard correlations and 
Bayesian correlations. The results (tables and corresponding scatterplots) can be found in 
Appendix D. 
Of the six tasks, five were significantly positively correlated with mean accuracy: the CELF 
Linguistic Concepts score, the CELF Sentence Structure score, the ERB Preschool 
Repetition test score, the ERB Sentence Imitation test score, and the DCCS post-switch test 
score. Only the Day/Night score was not significantly correlated with mean accuracy. The 
Bayes factors obtained through the Bayesian correlation indicate that there was extreme 
evidence for a correlation with the CELF Linguistic Concepts score, substantial evidence for 
a correlation with the CELF Sentence Structure test score, and strong evidence for a 
correlation with the ERB Sentence Imitation. For the DCCS post-switch score, there was 
only anecdotal evidence for a positive correlation, while there was anecdotal evidence for no 
correlation between mean accuracy and the ERB Preschool Repetition score, and strong 
evidence for no correlation between mean accuracy and the Day/Night task score. Overall 
then, children who scored higher on one of the memory tasks ERB Sentence Imitation) and 
the standardised language tests (CELF Linguistic Concepts, CELF Sentence Structure) 
showed better comprehension in the connective comprehension task than children who 
scored lower.  
Three test scores were significantly negatively correlated with response times: the DCCS 
post-switch phase score, the CELF Linguistic Concepts test score, and the CELF Sentence 
Structure test score. However, there was strong evidence only for the correlation with the 
Linguistic Concepts score. The evidence for the correlation with the CELF Sentence 
structure test score and the DCCS post-switch phase score were only anecdotal. In addition, 
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there was substantial evidence for the lack of a correlation between mean RTs and the 
Day/Night test scores, and the ERB Preschool Repetition test score. Thus, overall, only the 
CELF Linguistic Concepts score was strongly negatively correlated with the speed of 
responses, that is, higher CELF scores were correlated with faster response times. 
3.4.3. INFLUENCE ON ACCURACY AND MEAN RT 
On the basis of the results of the correlation tests, the CELF Linguistic Concepts score and 
the two ERB scores (Preschool Repetition and Sentence Imitation), which serve as 
indicators for working memory, were entered into the optimal model for the prediction of 
accuracy in the connective comprehension task (see section 3.2.1). Recall that the capacity-
constrained account predicts that memory capacity should make an independent contribution 
to children’s performance in the comprehension experiment. Similarly, the CELF Linguistic 
Concepts score was added to the optimal model for the prediction of response times in the 
connective comprehension task (see section 3.2.2). 
Of the three predictors added to the Accuracy model, only one remained significant and was 
kept in the model: the CELF Linguistic Concepts score (see Table 12). However, the more 
complex models that included these additional factors did not converge, a problem that has 
been noted for mixed-effect models that have multi-level factors (Eager & Roy, 2017). The 
Bayesian analysis, which did not suffer from non-convergence problems, suggested that the 
data was 1.5 times more likely under the original model than under the model that included 
the CELF Linguistic Concepts score (“anecdotal evidence”), and about 23 times more likely 
under the original model than under the one that included the two memory-related scores, 
ERB PSRep and ERB Sentence Imitation (“strong evidence”). (For a visualisation, see 
Figure D 4 in Appendix D.) 
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Estimate Std Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.14 0.16 0.86 .39 
AgeGroup5 -0.32 0.22 -1.42 .16 
Typebefore -0.07 0.19 -0.38 .70 
Typebecause 0.22 0.21 1.03 .30 
Typeif 0.13 0.21 0.62 .53 
ClauseOrdersub-main 0.03 0.19 0.15 .88 
scale(LingCon) 0.15 0.06 2.45 < .01 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore 1.38 0.29 4.70 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause 0.16 0.28 0.56 .58 
AgeGroup5:Typeif -0.09 0.28 -0.34 .74 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.85 0.29 2.96 < .01 
AgeGroup4:Typebefore: 
ClauseOrdersub-main 
0.21 0.27 0.75 .45 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore: 
ClauseOrdersub-main 
-1.35 0.31 -4.39 < .0001 
AgeGroup4:Typebecause: 
ClauseOrdersub-main 
-0.01 0.28 -0.04 .97 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause: 
ClauseOrdersub-main 
-0.10 0.30 -0.32 .75 
AgeGroup4:Typeif:Clause 
Ordersub-main 
-0.12 0.28 -0.43 .67 
AgeGroup5:Typeif: 
ClauseOrdersub-main 
0.09 0.30 0.29 .77 
Table 12: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the log odds for accuracy responses: 
effects and Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 
4years, for Type: after, and for ClauseOrder: main-subordinate. Significant effects are highlighted in bold 
font. Note that because Type has four levels, this table shows the results only for the model with “after” 
as the reference level. The summaries of the models with the other three connectives as reference level 
showing the same effects can be found in Appendix D. 
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Standardised memory or language ability scores thus did not explain any additional variation 
in the accuracy data, over and above the variation that was explained by the interaction of 
the experimental factors AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. 
For response times, the CELF Linguistic Concepts score was a significant predictor. 
Children who scored higher on the language test had significantly shorter response times 
than children who scored lower (see Table 13), suggesting that there may be an 
independent contribution of general language ability to response times, although the data 
was about 1.8 times more likely under the Bayesian model without this additional predictor 
than under the one that included it, which suggests the contribution of the CELF scores to 
variation in reaction times may be relatively small. 
 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 4297.39 356.91 109.85 11.90 < 2e-16 
AgeGroup5 -1252.22 470.63 100.28 -2.60 < .05 
Typebefore 81.67 218.70 72.78 0.37 .71 
Typebecause 1037.84 325.82 45.20 3.18 < .01 
Typeif 1217.46 364.26 61.46 3.34 < .01 
scale(LingCon) -487.17 225.62 100.90 -2.11 < .05 
Table 13: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times (children): effects of Type and 
Linguistic Concepts scores. The reference level is “after”. Significant effects are highlighted in bold 
font. Note that because Type has four levels, this table shows the results only for “after” as the 
reference level. The summaries of the models with the other three connectives as reference level 
showing the same effects can be found in Appendix C. 
In summary, although several test scores were correlated with task performance (positively 
with mean accuracy, negatively with mean response times), none of those predicted any 
additional variance after accounting for the influence of the experimental factors. In 
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particular, we did not find any evidence for an independent contribution of memory to 
performance in the connective comprehension task, disconfirming hypothesis 7. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to test hypotheses predicted by four different accounts regarding 
children’s processing of complex sentences with the connectives after, before, because, and 
if. In what follows, we first argue that the data support the semantic account best. In the light 
of the results, we then go on to consider in more detail the role of semantic complexity on the 
one hand and input frequency on the other. Next we address the production-comprehension 
asymmetry suggested by our data, before discussing what the results say about the role of 
individual differences generally, and short-term memory in particular, in language 
comprehension. In the final part of the discussion, we lay out what it takes to construct a 
coherent mental model from complex sentences, relating the present research to the wider 
context of temporal-causal reasoning and the relationship between language and cognitive 
development. 
Iconicity as the key factor in complex sentence comprehension 
The children’s performance in terms of accuracy is mostly consistent with Clark’s (1971) 
semantic account. The five-year-old children showed a better understanding of sentences in 
which the order of events in the sentence matched the order of events in the real world 
(iconic sentences). In addition, they showed better comprehension of before-sentences 
compared to after-sentences, and in fact also compared to because- and if-sentences. Four-
year-olds, in contrast, while being above chance overall, showed only a very limited 
understanding of complex sentences. Our results add to the growing body of evidence that 
children expect that language directly maps onto the events in the real world, and experience 
comprehension problems when this is not the case (Blything & Cain, 2016; Blything et al., 
2015; Emerson, 1979; Feagans, 1980; French & Brown, 1977; Stevenson & Pollitt, 1987; 
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Trosborg, 1982). Importantly, our study is the first one to extend this finding to both because- 
and if-sentences, suggesting that this is a general principle in children’s processing of 
complex sentences, rather than one that is only employed with temporal clauses. It should 
be noted, however, that while the error-rates for non-iconic sentences were higher than 
those for iconic sentences, children did not consistently misinterpret non-iconic sentences as 
iconic; with the exception of before-sentences (which we discuss next), performance was at 
chance. This may indicate that children find non-iconic sentences un-interpretable, which 
leads them to choose randomly between two options, rather than imposing an iconic 
interpretation on every sentence. 
Semantic complexity vs. input frequency 
Also in support of Clark’s semantic account, we found a clear facilitative effect for before-
sentences, in both clause orders. However, we suggest that this is not due to differences in 
semantic features, but rather due to a confluence of factors, including frequency and 
syntactic form. Were it the case that children initially interpreted after-sentences as before-
sentences, as suggested by Clark, they should have performed much worse on after-
sentences than they did. Instead, these results could suggest that before has advantages 
over after in terms of both its semantic transparency, and how often it is used as a 
connective. Although both before and after are used more often in other constructions than 
as temporal connectives, the meaning of before is always either spatial (“to appear before 
the court”) or temporal, with clear similarities between the two. The meaning of after, 
however, is often more opaque, as for example in phrasal verbs (“to look after”, “to inquire 
after”). In addition, before is used in other constructions only about 1.5 times more often than 
as a temporal connective in complex sentences, whereas after occurs more than four times 
more often in other constructions in both adult written and spoken language, (Leech, 
Rayson, & Wilson, 2014), and in child-directed speech (De Ruiter et al., 2017). In other 
words, before has a more consistent form-meaning mapping. For the parser, this means that 
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there is more uncertainty attached to after with respect to the construction that is currently 
being processed, and as a consequence a higher chance of misanalysis. Children’s superior 
performance with iconic before-sentences can then be explained by the fact that these 
combine a lower-uncertainty word (before) with an iconic clause order that is main-
subordinate, unlike the other three connectives. Our results show clearly that syntactic form 
in terms of the distance between the subordinator and its resolution is not the determining 
factor in children’s processing of complex sentences, contrary to the syntactic account’s 
prediction. However, in combination with a more consistent form-meaning mapping and 
iconicity, the shorter recognition domain of the main-subordinate clause order may give 
iconic before-sentences an “edge” over the other sentence types. Iconic before-sentences 
are the only sentences that can be processed incrementally, without re-analysis. We are 
currently testing the hypothesis that a more consistent form-meaning mapping makes 
before-sentences easier for English children by conducting the same experiment in a 
language that is similar syntactically, but has different relative frequencies for using the 
different words as connectives: German. If the hypothesis is correct, the advantage of (non-
iconic) before-type-sentences should then disappear. If, on the other hand, the effect 
persists, this would support a semantic explanation along the lines of Clark (1971). 
If (relative) frequency does have some role to play in complex sentence comprehension after 
all, then the question is: Why were children in our experiment not better at comprehending 
because- and if-clauses, which are much more frequent in English than after- and before-
sentences? In the present study, the children showed in the causality task that they did 
understand that causes must precede effects, and the older age-group showed an 
understanding of because- and if-sentences in iconic order. But despite understanding some 
aspects of causality, performance was relatively low. Furthermore, children of both age 
groups were significantly slower in responding to because- and if-sentences compared to 
after- and before-sentences.  
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One possible explanation is due to the sentences’ higher semantic complexity. 
Understanding isolated because- and if-sentences requires an understanding of both 
temporality and causality, purely through language, whereas before- and after-sentences 
rely on temporality only. Furthermore, causality may be semantically more complex than 
temporality: it has been observed that in production, children use the connective and to 
express semantic relations in the order of additive < temporal < causal < adversative (L 
Bloom, Lahey, Hood, Lifter, & Fiess, 1980), which have been said to be of increasing 
semantic complexity, following the notion of cumulative complexity introduced by Brown 
(1973). But if the cumulative complexity assumption holds also for comprehension, it 
remains unclear why there was no difference in accuracy between the semantically simpler 
after-sentences on the one hand, and the semantically more complex because- and if-
sentences on the other. Interestingly, the response time data are in line with the assumption 
of cumulative complexity: Responses to because- and if-sentences were slower than to 
after- and before-sentences. This suggests that processing two clauses that are causally 
linked takes longer than processing clauses that are only temporally linked. There is thus an 
interesting disconnect between the accuracy data, which showed an advantage for iconic 
sentences, and for before-sentences in general, and the RT data, which showed an 
advantage for temporal clauses. It is possible that children perceive temporal sentences to 
be easier (and thus react more quickly), even if their actual levels of accuracy indicate 
comprehension difficulties, at least for (non-iconic) after-sentences. Processing causal 
sentences may take more time, but it does not necessarily lead to more errors. 
Production-comprehension asymmetry 
An argument against the cumulative complexity account as an explanation is that children 
also start producing because- and if-sentences before they start producing after- and before-
sentences (e.g., Diessel, 2004), suggesting that they find because- and if-sentences easier. 
Production-comprehension asymmetries raise interesting questions in language acquisition 
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research, and different accounts have been put forward. (see e.g., Grimm, Müller, Hamann, 
& Ruigendijk, 2011). Here we suggest two possible explanations for this mismatch. First, it 
may be that producing because- and if-sentences in natural interaction puts different 
demands on children than comprehending them in an experiment. In spontaneous 
production, children go from intended meaning to form, all within a supporting linguistic and 
non-linguistic context (usually the here-and-now). They already know what the relation is 
between two events they want to express. They can also avoid more complex forms and use 
alternative strategies (e.g., stringing clauses together using “and then” to express temporal 
order, instead of an after-/before-sentence). In comprehension, and in particular in 
experiments that do not provide any additional context, children need to rely purely on form 
to understand the meaning (we discuss the requirements for constructing meaning below). 
Second, it may be that children are less familiar with because- and if-sentences being used 
to express physical causality. Recall that in everyday conversation, speakers use because-
clauses primarily to give reasons for a preceding speech act (“You can’t have sweets now 
because we’re having dinner soon”), and if-clauses often provide a conceptual framework for 
a larger chunk of discourse (“If I ever win the lottery, I have plenty ideas of what to do with 
the money.”). On the other hand, both experimental and observational studies have found 
that at least Dutch children are able to express content-type causality from three years 
onwards, suggesting this domain is not uncommon for young children (Evers-Vermeul & 
Sanders, 2011). Future studies should investigate how providing more context or using other 
types of causality affects children’s comprehension of causal sentences. 
Individual differences and memory 
Turning now to the role of individual differences, we found that the accuracy data and the RT 
data showed similar patterns with respect to their relationship with individual measures of 
language ability, memory, and executive function (inhibition). Children with higher scores on 
these tasks achieved higher accuracy in the comprehension task, and responded more 
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quickly. However, these factors did not explain any variation in performance after effects of 
age, type of sentence, and clause order were accounted for. In particular, we did not find any 
evidence for an independent contribution of memory, contrary to the predictions made by the 
capacity-constrained account. Note that not only did we not find any significant effect of 
memory; using a Bayesian approach, we found strong evidence against the role of memory 
and other measures in the models. It is possible that our measures (word- and non-word 
repetition and sentence imitation) did not capture the type of memory that is central to 
complex sentence comprehension. Blything et al. (2015) and Blything and Cain (2016), who 
observed a memory effect, used a digit-span task. However, in view of the fact that the 
researchers who originally proposed the memory capacity-constrained account measured 
memory capacity using reading span (Just & Carpenter, 1992), we believe that with children, 
sentence imitation (with sentences of increasing length) is a comparable measure. Against 
this background, our results do not provide evidence for a significant role of individual 
differences in memory, executive function, and general language ability in complex sentence 
comprehension. This contrasts with other studies that have found that variability in aspects 
such as working memory or executive function is associated with different language 
outcomes, even after controlling for age (e.g., Blything & Cain, 2016; White, Alexander, & 
Greenfield, 2017), but our findings are far from uncommon, as the picture is rather mixed 
(see Kidd, 2013 for a critical review of the role of working memory). Overall, our findings 
suggest that the ability to construct a coherent mental model from isolated complex 
sentences is not just a competence emerging from a combination of general language ability, 
memory, and executive function, but a distinct construct that cannot be captured with 
standardised tests.  
What is this construct and how does it develop over time? We first discuss our results in 
relation to previous studies, before connecting them to the wider context of the development 
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of temporal-causal reasoning, and the relationship between language and cognitive 
development. 
Temporal-causal reasoning and the construction of mental event representations 
In our data, four-year-olds showed only a rudimentary ability to process complex sentences 
in isolation, whereas the five-year-olds showed a more robust – albeit still incomplete – 
understanding. For before and after, this contrasts with some previous studies, which found 
above-chance performance at a slightly younger age, between three and four years (e.g., 
Blything et al., 2015). We attribute this difference to the fact that the task required that the 
children consider two explicit alternatives (“story” A and “story” B) before making a selection. 
As we discuss below, this requires that the listener have a stable mental representation of 
the events, which she can handle flexibly to reason about temporal and causal relations 
between them. For because and if, our findings are more in line with those of Amidon (1976), 
who found above-chance performance in her youngest age group (five years), and not with 
those of Emerson (1979) and Emerson and Gekoski (1980), who found children to 
comprehend because- and if-sentences only around the age of eight years.  
Research on children’s capacity to reason (non-linguistically) about temporal and causal 
relations events using search and planning tasks has found that flexible temporal–causal 
reasoning develops around the age of five or six years (Lohse, Kalitschke, Ruthmann, & 
Rakoczy, 2015; e.g., McCormack & Hanley, 2011). The basic logic of the tasks is that 
participants need to mentally reconstruct or pre-construct a sequence of causally linked 
events in order to correctly infer a present or anticipated future state of the world (e.g., an 
object’s location). While four-year-olds usually do not have problems understanding the 
temporal priority principle (Rankin & McCormack, 2013) – as in the present study –, it 
appears that they cannot perform in these search and planning tasks unless under specific 
conditions, indicating that they lack the capacity to reason flexibly about temporal-causal 
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relations. Specifically, younger children seem to be able to perform this task only when it 
refers to past events, but not when they have to mentally construct a sequence of events 
themselves to make inferences (McCormack & Hanley, 2011). Furthermore, younger 
children appear to require visible, positive evidence (e.g., a clear sign that an object had 
been used in a particular location) to infer a state of events (e.g., that the object must have 
been lost after it was used in that location). Older children, in contrast, can also use the 
absence of evidence to perform inferences (i.e., use counterfactual reasoning; Lohse et al., 
2015). 
How could this background help explain the difference between the current findings and 
those of Blything et al. (2015), who found that their youngest age group (three-to-four-year-
olds) performed better with before- and after-sentences than the four-year-olds in the 
present study? In Blything et al.’s study, children watched short animated clips of the actions 
of both clauses of the complex sentence (e.g., eating a hotdog, putting shoes on) 
successively next to each other, which ended in a freeze frame. They then heard the prompt 
“Listen carefully and touch the thing Tom/Sue did first”, followed by the sentence (e.g., 
“Before he ate the burger, he put on the sandals”). In contrast, in the present study, children 
first heard the prompt, followed by the sentence (e.g., “After she paints the old fence, she 
hoovers the house”), and then saw the two picture stories. The children in Blything et al.’s 
study were aware that they had to pay attention only to what happened first, and they knew 
what the two possible actions were before even hearing the sentence. The children in the 
present study had to first construct a mental representation of the chain of events from 
language only, without any initial visual support, and then needed to check this model 
against two possible laid out sequences. The research on temporal-causal reasoning 
outlined above suggests that creating a mental sequence “from scratch” may be challenging 
for four-year-olds, so we would expect those representations to be more fragile than those 
that are supported visually from the start, and may not yet be stable enough to reason about 
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them in order to make a selection on the screen (e.g., “if this is what happens, then the story 
at the top must be the right one”). We suggest that the task used in the present study is 
actually a closer match to what listeners typically have to do: construct a mental model from 
the speech input alone, and use that model subsequently, for example to make a decision 
(e.g., “Before you do your homework, put your clothes in the laundry basket” – what needs to 
happen now?).  
The relationship between language and cognitive development 
An important question arising from these different strands of research concerns the mutual 
influence of language and cognition. Is it the development of temporal-causal reasoning 
capacities that allows children to understand complex sentences describing chains of events 
in different ways (iconic and non-iconic)? Or is it children’s situated language experience that 
leads them to develop more flexible representations of events? For example, a child may 
encounter a non-iconic sentence in a situation where the real-world context makes it clear 
what the order of events is (“Before you go to bed you need to brush your teeth”), which 
enables her to understand that language can describe events in non-iconic ways, which in 
turn leads to a more abstract and flexible understanding of how two (or more) events are 
linked. It seems likely that as in other areas of language and cognitive development (e.g. 
complex complement clauses and theory of mind, De Villiers, 2007), a bidirectional 
relationship exists with developments in each domain supporting the other. 
In the context of causal reasoning, it is interesting to note that the few errors that the adults 
made in the present study occurred almost exclusively (eight out of eleven) with one item. 
The test sentence was “If/because she dives in the pool, she feels really warm”, and the 
correct story was one showing the protagonist diving into a heated pool in a wintery 
landscape outside and enjoying the warmth, whereas the foil sequence shows her standing 
in the sun in the summer and then diving into a (cold) pool. It appears that several adult 
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participants interpreted the sentence in an epistemic way, in the sense of “If she dives in the 
pool then that must mean that she’s feeling warm”, which makes the foil the better match. 
This item did not stand out from the other items in the children’s data, which suggests that 
this epistemic interpretation may not yet have been open to them. This would be in line with 
corpus studies of English, French, and Dutch child language, which have found that 
subjective causal relations appear later than objective relations (e.g., Evers-Vermeul & 
Sanders, 2011; Zufferey, Mak, & Sanders, 2015).  
The five-year-olds in the present study were still far from adult-like in their performance. It is 
clear that complex sentence comprehension must undergo substantial development 
throughout the school years. School education, and literacy training in particular, is likely to 
contribute to this development. Children are exposed to written texts and taught to pay 
attention to elements that link clauses and sentences with each other in order to understand 
the meaning of a text. This will also impact their spoken language comprehension. 
Furthermore, children will develop their understanding (and production) of other forms of 
causal language, in particular epistemic language. At this point it is still unclear what the role 
of the input (either spoken or written) may be in children’s development of different forms of 
causal language. 
This study investigated the role of syntax, semantics, frequency, and working memory in the 
comprehension of complex sentences involving adverbial clauses. To limit the availability of 
additional cues to meaning and therefore provide a relatively pure test, sentences were 
deliberately presented with minimal contextual support. Of course, in reality, complex 
sentences are typically used in discourse, and thus another question concerns how their 
processing is affected by information structure, or discourse pragmatics. It has been found 
that adult listeners find sentences in which given information precedes new information 
easier to process (Haviland & Clark, 1974) and there is an indication that young children 
(three to five years) prefer a given-before-new order in when-sentences containing a main 
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and subordinate clause (Junge, Theakston, & Lieven, 2015). An interesting avenue for future 
studies would be to explore how information structure affects children’s comprehension of 
different types of complex sentences, and to what extent such an effect may interact with the 




In this paper, we provide the most comprehensive experimental study to date to evaluate 
four theoretical models of the factors underpinning children’s abilities to comprehend 
complex sentences containing adverbial clauses. We found that children’s comprehension 
was strongly influenced by semantic factors – the iconicity of the event-to-language 
mappings – and their response times were influenced by the type of relation expressed 
(temporal vs. causal). We found that neither input frequency (frequency-based account), nor 
clause order (syntax account) or working memory (capacity-constrained account) provided a 
good fit to the data. Our findings thus contribute to the development of more sophisticated 
models of sentence processing to apply through acquisition and into adulthood. Although the 
stimuli used in the present study were deliberately designed to be challenging, we would 
argue that they reflect the demands placed on children in everyday life, especially in 
academic contexts. We conclude that models of linguistic processing and representation 
must take into account how children’s emerging linguistic understanding interacts with 
developments in other cognitive domains such as their ability to construct mental models 
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no. Sentence List 1 Sentence List 3 
1 
1 
After she paints the old fence, 
she hoovers the house. 
Before she paints the old fence, 
she hoovers the house. 
2 
After he sweeps the new floor, he 
watches TV. 
Before he sweeps the new floor, he 
watches TV. 
3 
He drinks some water, after he 
eats a green pear. 
He drinks some water, before he 
eats a green pear. 
4 
He laughs really hard, after he 
coughs a few times. 
He laughs really hard, before he 
coughs a few times. 
5 
She hides over there, after she 
runs over here. 
She hides over there, before she 
runs over here. 
6 
After she dances around, she 
bounces away. 
Before she dances around, she 
bounces away. 
7 
Before he reads his new book, he 
plays his big drum. 
After he reads his new book, he 
plays his big drum. 
8 
She takes a hot bath, before she 
draws a picture. 
She takes a hot bath, after she 
draws a picture. 
9 
She breaks her small train, 
before she builds a tower. 
She breaks her small train, after 
she builds a tower. 
10 
She hops up and down, before 
she crawls on the floor. 
She hops up and down, after she 
crawls on the floor. 
11 
Before he shouts out loudly, he 
drives away fast. 
After he shouts out loudly, he 
drives away fast. 
12 
Before he waves happily, he 
swims on his back. 
After he waves happily, he swims 
on his back. 
13 
Because she bangs her head 
hard, she closes her eyes. 
If she bangs her head hard, she 
closes her eyes. 
14 
Because he opens the door, he 
sees the snowman. 
If he opens the door, he sees the 
snowman. 
15 
He misses the bus, because he 
rides his old bike. 
He misses the bus, if he rides his 
old bike. 
16 
He cries really hard, because he 
trips suddenly. 
He cries really hard, if he trips 
suddenly. 
17 
She feels really warm, because 
she dives in the pool. 
She feels really warm, if she dives 
in the pool. 
18 
Because she looks at the sky, 
she slips to the ground. 
If she looks at the sky, she slips to 
the ground. 
19 
If he sings a happy song, he wins 
a nice cup. 
Because he sings a happy song, 
he wins a nice cup. 
20 
She finds her other shoe, if she 
cuts the long grass. 
She finds her other shoe, because 
she cuts the long grass. 
21 
She hears the doorbell, if she 
presses the button. 
She hears the doorbell, because 
she presses the button. 
22 
She wakes up in the night, if she 
talks to herself. 
She wakes up in the night, 
because she talks to herself. 
23 
If he sits down in his chair, he 
gets very bored. 
Because he sits down in his chair, 
he gets very bored. 
24 
If he sneezes lots of times, he 
falls in the field. 
Because he sneezes lots of 




She hoovers the house, after she 
paints the old fence. 
She hoovers the house, before 
she paints the old fence. 
2 
He watches TV, after he sweeps 
the new floor. 
He watches TV, before he 
sweeps the new floor. 
3 
After he eats a green pear, he 
drinks some water. 
Before he eats a green pear, he 
drinks some water. 
4 
After he coughs a few times, he 
laughs really hard. 
Before he coughs a few times, 
he laughs really hard. 
5 
After she runs over here, she 
hides over there 
Before she runs over here, she 
hides over there 
6 
She bounces away, after she 
dances around. 
She bounces away, before she 
dances around. 
7 
He plays his big drum, before he 
reads his new book. 
He plays his big drum, after he 
reads his new book. 
8 
Before she draws a picture, she 
takes a hot bath. 
After she draws a picture, she 
takes a hot bath. 
9 
Before she builds a tower, she 
breaks her small train. 
After she builds a tower, she 
breaks her small train. 
10 
Before she crawls on the floor, 
she hops up and down. 
After she crawls on the floor, 
she hops up and down. 
11 
He drives away fast, before he 
shouts out loudly. 
He drives away fast, after he 
shouts out loudly. 
12 
He swims on his back, before he 
waves happily. 
He swims on his back, after he 
waves happily. 
13 
She closes her eyes, because 
she bangs her head hard. 
She closes her eyes, if she 
bangs her head hard. 
14 
He sees the snowman, because 
he opens the door. 
He sees the snowman, if he 
opens the door. 
15 
Because he rides his old bike, he 
misses the bus. 
If he rides his old bike, he 
misses the bus. 
16 
Because he trips suddenly, he 
cries really hard. 
If he trips suddenly, he cries 
really hard. 
17 
Because she dives in the pool, 
she feels really warm. 
If she dives in the pool, she 
feels really warm. 
18 
She slips to the ground, because 
she looks at the sky. 
She slips to the ground, if she 
looks at the sky. 
19 
He wins a nice cup, if he sings a 
happy song. 
He wins a nice cup, because he 
sings a happy song. 
20 
If she cuts the long grass, she 
finds her other shoe. 
Because she cuts the long 
grass, she finds her other shoe. 
21 
If she presses the button, she 
hears the doorbell. 
Because she presses the 
button, she hears the doorbell. 
22 
If she talks to herself, she wakes 
up in the night. 
Because she talks to herself, 
she wakes up in the night. 
23 
He gets very bored, if he sits 
down in his chair. 
He gets very bored, because he 
sits down in his chair. 
24 
He falls in the field, if he sneezes 
lots of times. 
He falls in the field, because he 
sneezes lots of times. 
Table A 1: Experimental sentences for the experimental Lists 1 and 3. Note that in List 3, all after-
sentences from List 1 have been changed to before-sentences, and vice versa. In the same way, all 
because-sentences from List 1 were changed to if-sentences in List 3, and vice versa. Experimental lists 
2 and 4 were created by swapping session 1 and 2 of List 1 and List 3, respectively. 
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APPENDIX B 
Fixed effects Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -0.01 0.16 -0.04 097 
AgeGroup5 1.21 0.23 5.19 < .0001 
Typeafter 0.08 0.19 0.39 .7 
Typebecause 0.29 0.21 1.38 .17 
Typeif 0.21 0.21 0.97 .33 
ClauseOrdersub-main 0.24 0.19 1.21 .22 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter -1.38 0.29 -4.71 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause -1.22 0.3 -4.15 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typeif -1.48 0.29 -5.01 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.71 0.3 -2.4 < .05 
AgeGroup4:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.21 0.27 -0.76 0.45 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-
main 
1.35 0.31 4.39 < .0001 
AgeGroup4:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-
main 
-0.22 0.28 -0.79 .43 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-
main 
1.26 0.31 4.02 < .001 
AgeGroup4:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.32 0.28 -1.18 0 24 
AgeGroup5:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main 1.44 0.31 4.64 <. 0001 
Table B 1: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the Accuracy responses: effects and 
Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 4years, for 
Type: before, and for ClauseOrder: main-subordinate. Significant effects are highlighted in bold font. 
Note that because before is the reference level (for which the 5-year-olds performed better than the 4-
year-olds), this model shows a main effect of AgeGroup, with the 5-year-olds being significantly better 
than the 4-year-olds. 
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Fixed effects Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.29 0.16 1.76 .08 
AgeGroup5 -0.01 0.22 -0.06 .96 
Typebefore -0.29 0.21 -1.38 .17 
Typeafter -0.22 0.21 -1.02 .31 
Typeif -0.09 0.20 -0.45 .66 
ClauseOrdersub-main 0.02 0.20 0.10 .92 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore 1.22 0.30 4.14 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter -0.16 0.28 -0.57 .57 
AgeGroup5:Typeif -0.25 0.28 -0.89 .38 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.76 0.29 2.60 < .05 
AgeGroup4:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.22 0.28 0.79 .43 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-
main -1.26 0.31 -4.02 < .0001 
AgeGroup4:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.01 0.28 0.03 .97 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.10 0.30 0.32 .75 
AgeGroup4:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.11 0.28 -0.39 .70 
AgeGroup5:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.18 0.30 0.60 .55 
Table B 2: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the Accuracy responses: effects and 
Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 4years, for 
Type: because, and for ClauseOrder: main-subordinate. Significant effects are highlighted in bold font. 
Fixed effects Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.20 0.16 1.22 .22 
AgeGroup5 -0.26 0.22 -1.21 .23 
Typebecause 0.09 0.20 0.45 .65 
Typebefore -0.20 0.21 -0.97 .33 
Typeafter -0.13 0.21 -0.61 .54 
ClauseOrdersub-main -0.09 0.20 -0.45 .65 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause 0.25 0.28 0.89 .38 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore 1.47 0.29 5.00 <.0001 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter 0.09 0.28 0.32 .75 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main 1.05 0.29 3.63 <.001 
AgeGroup4:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.11 0.28 0.38 .70 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.18 0.30 -0.60 .55 
AgeGroup4:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.32 0.28 1.17 .24 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-
main -1.44 0.31 -4.64 <.0001 
AgeGroup4:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.12 0.28 0.42 .67 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.09 0.30 -0.29 .77 
Table B 3: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the Accuracy responses: effects and 
Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 4years, for 




 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 4667.62 357.04 88.87 13.073 < 2e-16 
AgeGroup5 1750.53 417.22 65.68 -4.196 8.34E-05 
Typeafter -89.33 219.39 136.53 -0.407 .68454 
Typebecause 958.04 303.26 36.28 3.159 < .05 
Typeif 1138.22 337.53 46.96 3.372 < .01 
Table C 1: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times: effects of AgeGroup and Type. 
The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 4years, for Type: before. Significant effects are highlighted in 
bold font.  
 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 5625.68 385.31 108.72 14.494 < 2e-16 
AgeGroup5 -1750.68 417.23 99.86 -4.095 8.58e-05 
Typebefore -1047.37 327.32 45.44 -3.193 < .01 
Typeafter -957.94 303.18 35.33 -3.153 < .01 
Typeif 180.27 247.59 72.91 0.726 .4703 
Table C 2:: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times: effects of AgeGroup and Type. 
The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 4years, for Type: because. Significant effects are highlighted in 
bold font.  
 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 5805.84 417.6 102.61 13.903 < 2e-16 
AgeGroup5 -1750.53 417.22 65.68 -4.196 8.34E-05 
Typeafter -1227.54 365.56 56.32 -3.358 < .01 
Typebefore -1138.22 337.53 46.96 -3.372 <.01 
Typebecause -180.18 247.81 63.97 -0.727 .46982 
Table C 3: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times: effects of AgeGroup and Type. 
The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 4years, for Type: if. Significant effects are highlighted in bold 
font.  
 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 877.5 190.9 11.4 4.596 < 0.0017 
Typeafter 206.4 103.5 433.7 1.995 < 0.05 
Typebecause 207.4 106.2 53.5 1.954 .056 
Typeif 271.9 108.1 54.4 2.514 < 0.05 
Table C 4: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times for the adult group: effect of Type. 
The reference level is “after”. Significant effects are highlighted in bold font. Note that because Type has 
four levels, this table shows the results only for the model with “before” as the reference level.  
 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 1084.92 191.06 11.4 5.678 .000123 
Typeafter -0.99 106.65 54.3 -0.009 .992627 
Typebefore -207.42 106.17 53.5 -1.954 .055967 
Typeif 64.44 105.54 464.7 0.611 .541794 
Table C 5: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times for the adult group: effect of Type. 
The reference level is “after”. Significant effects are highlighted in bold font. Note that because Type has 
four levels, this table shows the results only for the model with “because” as the reference level.  
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 Estimate Std. Error df t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 1149.35 192.17 11.7 5.981 7.10E-05 
Typeafter -65.43 108.56 55 -0.603 .5492 
Typebefore -271.86 108.14 54.4 -2.514 < 0.05 
Typebecause -64.44 105.54 408.4 -0.611 .5418 
Table C 6: Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model for response times for the adult group: effect of Type. 
The reference level is “after”. Significant effects are highlighted in bold font. Note that because Type has 





Figure D 1: Individual dots represent individual scores (raw data). Bars indicate means, beans indicate 
smoothed density, and bands indicate the 95% Bayesian Highest Density Interval (HDI). The pirate plot 
has been produced using the R package “yarrr” (Phillips, 2016). 
 Standard correlation Bayesian correlation 
Task r t df p r BF 
CELF Linguistic 
Concepts 0.43 3.96 70 < .001* 0.41 102.4
◊ 
CELF Sentence 
Structure 0.32 2.85 70 < .01* 0.31 4.16
◊ 
ERB PSRep 0.24 2.03 69 < .05* 0.25 0.68 
ERB Sentence 
Imitation 0.38 3.38 69 < .01* 0.37 15.56
◊ 
Day/Night 0.02 0.15 70  .87 0.02 0.09◊ 
DCCS post-switch 0.31 2.71 70 < .01* 0.30 2.9 
Table D 1: Correlation coefficients, t-values, degrees of freedom (df), probabilities (p), correlation 
coefficients obtained through Bayesian tests, and Bayes factors (BF) for the correlations between 
standardised test scores (z-scores) and mean accuracy. Asterisks indicate statistical significance; 
diamonds indicate at least substantial evidence (for the H0, that is, no correlation if below 1/3, for the HA, 
if above 3). 
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Figure D 2: Scatterplots showing the relationship between mean accuracy (MeanAcc) and the raw test 
scores for both age groups in the Linguistic Concepts sub-test, the CELF Sentence Structure sub-test, 
the ERB Preschool Repetition subtest (PSRep), the ERB Sentence imitation sub-test, the Day/Night task, 
and the DCCS post-switch phase. Blue lines indicate smoothed conditional means, grey shades indicate 
confidence intervals. Red dotted lines indicate chance level. 
 Standard correlation Bayesian correlation 
Task r t df p r BF 
CELF Linguistic 
Concepts -0.37 -3.30 69 < .01* -0.36 13.79
◊ 
CELF Sentence 
Structure -0.24 -2.05 69 < .05* -0.23 0.70 
ERB PSRep -0.06 -0.5 68 .6194 -0.06 0.11 
ERB Sentence 
Imitation -0.22 -1.88 68 .06 -0.22 0.51 
Day/Night -0.10 -0.87 69 .39 -0.10 0.13 
DCCS post-switch -0.26 -2.25 69 < .05* -0.25 1.04 
Table D 2: Correlation coefficients, t-values, degrees of freedom (df), probabilities (p), correlation 
coefficients obtained through Bayesian tests, and Bayes factors (BF) for the correlations between 
standardised test scores (z-scores) and mean response times. Asterisks indicate statistical significance; 




Figure D 3:Scatterplots showing the relationship between mean response time (MeanRT) and the raw 
test scores for both age groups in the Linguistic Concepts sub-test, the CELF Sentence Structure sub-
test, the ERB Preschool Repetition subtest (PSRep), the ERB Sentence imitation sub-test, the Day/Night 
task, and the DCCS post-switch phase. Blue lines indicate smoothed conditional means, grey shades 




Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.1 0.2 0.402  .69 
AgeGroup5 1.1 0.2 4.457  < .0001 
Typeafter 0.1 0.2 0.383  .70 
Typebecause 0.3 0.2 1.383  .17 
Typeif 0.2 0.2 0.966  .33 
ClauseOrdersub-main 0.2 0.2 1.213  .23 
scale(LingCon) 0.2 0.1 2.446 < .05 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter -1.4 0.3 -4.701 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause -1.2 0.3 -4.146 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typeif -1.5 0.3 -5.002 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.7 0.3 -2.395 < .05 
AgeGroup4:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.2 0.3 -0.755  .45 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main 1.4 0.3 4.389 < .0001 




4.016 < .001 
AgeGroup4:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.3 0.3 -1.173 0.24 
AgeGroup5:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main 1.4 0.3 4.636 < .0001 
Table D 3: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the log odds for accuracy responses: 
effects and Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 
4years, for Type: before, and for ClauseOrder: main-subordinate. Significant effects are highlighted in 
bold font.  
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 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.4 0.2 2.178  .48 
AgeGroup5 -0.2 0.2 -0.707  .31 
Typeafter -0.2 0.2 -1.025  .17 
Typebefore -0.3 0.2 -1.378  66 
Typeif -0.1 0.2 -0.446  .92 
ClauseOrdersub-main 0.0 0.2 0.095 <  .05 
scale(LingCon) 0.2 0.1 2.445  .57 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter -0.2 0.3 -0.565 <  .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore 1.2 0.3 4.14  .38 
AgeGroup5:Typeif -0.3 0.3 -0.886 <  .01 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.8 0.3 2.592  .97 
AgeGroup4:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.0 0.3 0.035  .75 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.1 0.3 0.323  .43 
AgeGroup4:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.2 0.3 0.785 <  .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-main -1.3 0.3 -4.013  .70 
AgeGroup4:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.1 0.3 -0.386  .55 
AgeGroup5:Typeif:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.2 0.3 0.602  .48 
Table D 4: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the log odds for accuracy responses: 
effects and Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 
4years, for Type: before, and for ClauseOrder: main-subordinate. Significant effects are highlighted in 
bold font.  
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.3 0.2 1.651  .10 
AgeGroup5 -0.4 0.2 -1.83  .07 
Typeafter -0.1 0.2 -0.611  .54 
Typebefore -0.2 0.2 -0.967  .33 
Typebecause 0.1 0.2 0.45  .65 
ClauseOrdersub-main -0.1 0.2 -0.448  .65 
scale(LingCon) 0.2 0.1 2.444 <  .05 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter 0.1 0.3 0.325  .74 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore 1.5 0.3 5.002 < .0001 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause 0.3 0.3 0.882  .38 
AgeGroup5:ClauseOrdersub-main 1.0 0.3 3.629 <  .001 
AgeGroup4:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.1 0.3 0.42  .67 
AgeGroup5:Typeafter:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.1 0.3 -0.288  .77 
AgeGroup4:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.3 0.3 1.175  .24 
AgeGroup5:Typebefore:ClauseOrdersub-main -1.4 0.3 -4.635 <  .0001 
AgeGroup4:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-main 0.1 0.3 0.38  .70 
AgeGroup5:Typebecause:ClauseOrdersub-main -0.2 0.3 -0.599  .55 
Table D 5: Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model for the log odds for accuracy responses: 
effects and Interactions of AgeGroup, Type, and ClauseOrder. The reference levels are for AgeGroup: 





Figure D 4: Bayes factors for five different models predicting accuracy, compared to the null model 
(intercept). 
